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Security Attacks on Smart Grid Scheduling and Their Defences:
A Game–Theoretic Approach
M. Pilz, F. Baghaei Naeini, K. Grammont, C. Smagghe,
M. Davis, J.-C. Nebel, L. Al-Fagih, and E. Pfluegel
The introduction of advanced communication infrastructure into the power grid raises a plethora of new opportunities to tackle
climate change. This paper is concerned with the security of energy management systems which are expected to be implemented in
the future smart grid. The existence of a novel class of false data injection attacks that are based on modifying forecasted demand
data is demonstrated, and the impact of the attacks on a typical system’s parameters is identified, using a simulated scenario.
Monitoring strategies that the utility company may employ in order to detect the attacks are proposed and a game–theoretic
approach is used to support the utility company’s decision–making process for the allocation of their defence resources. Informed
by these findings, a generic security game is devised and solved, revealing the existence of several Nash Equilibrium strategies.
The practical outcomes of these results for the utility company are discussed in detail and a proposal is made, suggesting how the
generic model may be applied to other scenarios.
Index Terms—Cyber Security, Game Theory, Smart Grid, False Data Injection, Defence Strategies, Decision–Making, Optimal
Resource Allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
DURING the last decade the rise of the smart gridhas shown significant potential to address not only the
traditional grid problems but also support the development
of power generation from renewable sources. Indeed, since
electricity suppliers must meet customers’ demand during peak
hours, they traditionally invest in power generation capacity
able to sustain those high power consumption periods. This
is an expensive solution as some of those resources are only
exploited sporadically. On the other hand, with the increase
of greenhouse gases that impact negatively on the Earth’s
ecosystem, better exploitation of renewable energy sources
is seen as a way to reduce their emissions [1]. However,
their inherent intermittency and unpredictability makes their
integration into the power grid particularly difficult. Therefore,
management of consumption and production plays a crucial
role to facilitate power distribution as well as reduction of
cost for both suppliers and consumers [2].
Traditional Demand-Side Management has designed strate-
gies to change consumers’ consumption patterns so that they
better match energy generation profiles: these include peak
clipping, load shifting, and flattening consumers’ loads [3].
Advancements in energy storage and renewable energy gen-
eration provide further opportunities to devise smarter and
efficient power grids. For instance, storing energy during off-
peak times eases supply during peak hours where there is high
demand. Furthermore, local electricity generation reduces sub-
stantially power dissipation and transmission costs. Accord-
ingly, the concept of ‘microgrids’ was introduced to facilitate
distribution by dividing the power grid into several smaller
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local grids [4]. Efficient management of these microgrids
require a two-way communication system between suppliers
and consumers, so that those smart grids can exploit distributed
information for storage scheduling and pricing purposes [5].
Taking advantage of smart meters, energy storage and
trading strategies, a variety of energy consumption scheduling
techniques aiming at optimally distributing daily power con-
sumption has been put forward to reduce a smart grid’s peak-
to-average ratio (PAR) of the aggregated load. In particular,
dynamic game–theoretic frameworks have been proposed to
optimise energy cost using their Nash Equilibrium [6], [7].
Some consider advanced battery models [8] and integrate
forecasting errors [9]. Alternatively, usage of a Stackelberg
game minimising both the PAR and the system total cost has
also proved promising [10]. More generally, comprehensive
reviews reveal the significant contribution that game–theoretic
solutions offer in terms of reducing consumer costs and PAR
values [11]–[15].
Since smart grids rely on a communication network and
smart meters, they may be vulnerable to cyber attacks [16].
As a result, appropriate defence strategies need to be put in
place [17]–[22]. False Data Injection (FDI) is one of the most
common approaches to attack cyber-physical systems [23]. In
general, FDI attacks target data integrity breaches to make
profit or disturb a system. Since, in power grids, state es-
timators are the main data sources used for monitoring and
controlling purposes, they are the target of data injection [24].
Such FDI attacks and possible defence strategies have been
investigated in several scenarios: (i) the ‘ideal’ undetectable at-
tack where the attack vector is built from complete knowledge
of the state estimators’ parameters [17]; (ii) a more realistic
attack relying on a probability distribution function where
only incomplete information about the system’s parameters is
available [25]; (iii) a stealth data injection in which an attacker
has complete information about the system’s topology [26].
Detection of cyber-attacks and associated defence strategies
are essential for a reliable grid. For instance, a fast detection
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algorithm has been proposed to deal with FDI and jamming
attacks in smart grids [27].
Since game theory has been a very successful framework
to improve cyber security [28], it has been applied in several
scenarios dealing with grid security. When attackers target
either a single or multiple state estimators, both Markovian
and static strategies have been investigated to defend against
load redistribution attacks by allocating optimal budgets to
energy suppliers [29]. If attackers manipulate price informa-
tion from the utility companies, its impact can be mittigated
exploiting a Stackelberg formulation [30]. Furthermore, it
has been proposed to defend against coalitional attacks by
multiple attackers using an iterated game–theoretic model [31],
where a probability of attack detection is considered in each
iteration: correlation between payoffs and penalty factors
demonstrated the effectiveness of the defence system. Finally,
a defence system against switching attacks based on a zero-
determinant iterative game between controller and attacker
showed that transient stabilisation could be achieved over
time [32]. Although grid cyber security has been an active
field of research, no defence scheme has yet been proposed to
protect forecasting data in smart grids.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) The design of a novel class of false data injection
attacks, preserving average daily load in a smart en-
ergy scheduling system. The forecasted demand data is
corrupted by a single attacker, targeting one or several
households. Using extensive simulations, two families
of attacks are investigated. The impact on both the PAR
of the aggregated load and consumer bills as well as the
resulting benefit for the attacker are analysed.
2) The design and analysis of an augmented security game
for monitoring average-preserving false data injection
attacks, based on a detailed model with strategies and
payoff functions informed by the simulation findings.
The conditions under which a pure Nash Equilibrium ex-
ists are derived. This extends previous work by providing
additional strategies and a more detailed payoff design,
informed by the various cost and benefit functions of the
utility company and the attacker.
3) To give practical guidelines to the utility company
on how to protect itself against such attacks. The
recommendations are based on combining a range of
mitigation strategies and the results of the equilibrium
analysis of the game, to aid the utility company with
the decision–making process of investing in the security
defence. The given advice is motivated by the simulation
scenario, but can also be adapted to other situations. This
is demonstrated using a concrete example.
This paper is organised as follows. The underlying smart
grid management model is introduced in Section II. Different
types of attacks are developed and their impacts are analysed
in Section III. A game–theoretic defence strategy for the utility
company is proposed in Section IV. Finally, the paper is
concluded in Section V.
II. SMART GRID MANAGEMENT MODEL
This section focuses on the description of the game–
theoretic scheduling model used in a smart grid management
model. After specifying the smart grid scenario including
the battery model, cost function and data specifications, the
scheduling game is presented. Note that a more detailed
description can be found in [9].
A. Scenario
The scenario of interest considers a residential neigh-
bourhood comprised of M houses where each household is
equipped with a smart meter. The set of households that
participates in the demand-side management (DSM) program
is denoted by N ⊂M, where M is the set of all households
in the neighbourhood. The total number of participants is
N = |N |. It is assumed that all M households are served
by the same utility company (UC).
Each day is split into T discrete intervals, where the set
of all intervals is represented by T . The DSM protocol runs
as follows: The forecasted demand is sent to the UC where
demand data are aggregated and sent to each DSM participant.
Based on this input, the households play a dynamic non-
cooperative game (cf. Section II-B). Its outcome is a set of
schedules, one for each household, that specify how they can
make best use of their battery system. The households follow
these schedules, even if their actual demand differs from
the forecasted one. Instead of using a forecasting algorithm,
random errors were added to actual demands in order to
simulate a realistic average error of 8% in individual forecasted
data as reported in [33]. More details about the process used
to simulate realistic forecasts can be found in Appendix A.
Households that participate in the DSM scheme are
equipped with a lithium-ion battery. Using the battery model
proposed in [8], [9], which includes charging, discharging, and
self-discharging characteristics of the battery, storing decisions
are made. They are denoted by the variable a.
The demand dtm ≥ 0 of a household m ∈ M is defined as
the amount of electricity that is needed to run all its appliances
during the time interval t ∈ T . Let ltm denote the load, i.e. the
amount of energy drawn from the grid by household m ∈M
during the interval t ∈ T . For the scheme participants, the
load depends on the decision atn taken at that specific interval,
it combines the demand with the amount of energy that is
charged or discharged by the battery ltn = d
t
n+a
t
n . Thus, the
grid total load during interval t is given by Lt =
∑
m∈M l
t
m .
In order to incentivise a reduction of load at peak times,
the UC charges the DSM participants using a dynamic pricing
tariff: The cost per energy unit is based on the aggregated
load of all users and is calculated separately for each interval.
As in [6], [34], this is expressed by a quadratic cost function
gt(y) = c2 · y2 + c1 · y + c0 , where y is the aggregated load
at time t given by Lt and the coefficients c2 > 0, c1 ≥ 0
and c0 ≥ 0. The electricity bill Bn (cf. [6], [8], [10]) of each
participant is given by:
Bn = −Ωn
∑
t∈T
gt ∀n ∈ N , (1)
where Ωn =
∑
t l
t
n∑
t
∑
k l
t
k
.
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B. The Scheduling Game
Formally, the game used to schedule battery usage is a
discrete time dynamic game, in which players, i.e. households,
have to decide how to use their battery during each individual
interval of the upcoming day. In this game, each household
has the objective to minimise their own costs as defined by
the electricity bill (1). As the electricity bill itself depends on
the aggregated load, the selfish behaviour of each individual
becomes equivalent to minimising the peak-to-average ratio of
the aggregated load (cf. [10]). It is defined as
PAR = T · maxt∈T L
t∑
t∈T Lt
. (2)
The theoretically optimal result is a perfectly flat curve with a
PAR value equal to 1.0. Since the mathematical details of the
game mechanics lie outside the scope of this manuscript, the
interested reader should refer to [9] for a thorough description.
In the following, the scheduling game is treated as a black–box
that takes forecasted demand data as an input and then outputs
schedules (one for each household) of optimal battery usage
for the upcoming day as defined by its Nash Equilibrium. An
optimal Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategy has a local maximum
property: any single player deviating from the NE strategy
will suffer a reduced payoff. It is important to note that only
unilateral strategy changes are considered in this concept.
Hence applying game theory for real–life scenarios is only
a valid and useful tool if all participants agree to adopt it
as a contract for strategic decision–making, in the modelled
scenario.
Fig. 1 shows an example of the scheduling impact of the
game on the aggregated load for one day. Whereas the load
profile without playing the game shows the usual peaks in the
morning and evening, it is possible to obtain a relatively flat
profile by means of the scheduling game. The first row of
Fig. 9 (in Appendix B) illustrates actual battery usage of each
household using a battery. As the dashed curve in the last row
of Fig. 9 shows, the higher the participation to the game, the
flatter the aggregated load.
C. Experimental Setup
Throughout the paper, all simulations are performed for
a neighbourhood of M = 25 households over a period of
365 consecutive days to allow for statistical analysis of the
outcomes. Each day is split into T = 24 intervals. The
respective demand data are taken from [35]. Every participant
of the DSM scheme is equipped with the same type of battery,
i.e. the Tesla Powerwall 2 (cf. [36]). Battery characteristics
such as efficiency, capacity, charging and discharging rates,
and degeneration behaviour are read off its data sheet. This
setup is deliberately chosen to be similar to the one investi-
gated in [9], [37] to allow for comparison of the outcomes.
III. FALSE DATA INJECTION ON FORECASTS
As motivated in Section I, the security of a smart energy
system is of extreme importance and there is a lack of research
on possible attacks on forecasted data. This section describes
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Fig. 1. Aggregated load comparison. The aggregated load of M = 25
households for a single day is shown for two scenarios: Without the game,
and after playing the game. Every household is equipped with a battery. As
players try to lower their electricity bill (1) (by means of their battery usage),
they directly affect the load profile. In this example, the PAR value of the
aggregated load (2) decreases from 1.69 to 1.04.
different types of potential attacks that may take advantage of
the game–theoretic smart grid management model presented
previously. Furthermore, outcomes of those attacks are anal-
ysed from the point of view of the attacker, the UC and
the other players. Various defence strategies to detect those
attacks are proposed and analysed. Finally, attack mitigation
is discussed.
A. Description of Attacks
All attack scenarios investigated in this section rely on
the following assumptions. First, the attacker (who is one
of the players) exploits the vulnerability of the smart grid
communication network: They have the ability not only to
intercept forecasting data from all the other players, but also
to replace them. Second, after the game has been played based
on the tampered data, the attacker adapts their storage schedule
and takes advantage of the erroneous schedules that the other
players follow. Finally, in order to limit the risk of having their
attack detected, the attacker makes sure that the average daily
aggregated load is not affected by their actions. Although there
are many strategies which can be applied to change forecasts
while maintaining a constant aggregated value of the load,
this study investigates two simple families of attacks: Forecast
shifting and scaling.
a) Shift Attack: The shift attack replaces a given forecast
with the original forecast after having undergone a circular
shift of σ time intervals, where σ is an integer. Since experi-
mental results have shown that a shift attack of 4 hours, see
Fig. 2, produces the most dramatic impact for the dataset of
interest (cf. Section. II-C), that value is used for the rest of
the study.
b) Scale Attack: The scale attack substitutes a given
forecast with a scaled version centred around its average value
for the day. To ensure that the day average is not affected,
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Fig. 2. Example of a shift attack. The reference curve shows the forecasted
load of an individual household for the upcoming day. When the attacker
applies the shift attack, they perform a circular shift of the interval data. The
result of a shift with σ = 4 is shown as an example.
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Fig. 3. Example of scale attacks. The reference curve shows the forecasted
load of an individual household for the upcoming day. It is identical to the
reference shown in Fig. 2. When the attacker applies the scale attack, they
scale the interval data with respect to the daily average of the forecasted load.
Scaling with a factor τ = 2 leads to more severe troughs and peaks, while
using τ = −1 results in a mirrored forecast. τ = 0 gives a perfectly flat load
profile.
the scaling parameter τ should be chosen such that no load
becomes negative after scaling. Note that for the dataset of in-
terest (cf. Section. II-C), a value of τ = 2 remains acceptable:
Although a couple of values do become negative, they are
set to 0; the day average is slightly increased, but it remains
within a realistic forecast uncertainty (cf. Appendix A). Fig. 3
illustrates the effect of various scale attacks, i.e. τ = −1,
τ = 0 and τ = 2. While τ = 1 returns the initial forecast,
τ = 0 and τ = −1 produces a flat, and mirrored forecast,
respectively. In the rest of the paper, these two different attacks
are called flat and mirror attack.
The outcome of an attack does not only depend on the type
of attack and its associated parameter, but also on the number
of forecasts which are replaced among all the players of a
game: the higher the percentage ρ of attacked households, the
0
1
2
3
4
In
di
vid
ua
l lo
ad
 (k
W
h) victim (w/o attack)
attacker (w/o attack)
victim (after attack)
attacker (after attack)
5 10 15 20
Intervals (h)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Pr
ic
e 
($/
kW
h)
Without attack
After attack
Fig. 4. Individual loads and unit price after scheduling. The top graph
displays load profiles for one day of a randomly picked victim and the attacker
for two different scenarios: with and without attack. While both references
show an almost flat profile (cf. Fig. 1), the load curves after the attack differ
considerably. This is a direct result of the attacker taking advantage of the
falsely injected data. The bottom graph displays the change of price per unit
during those two scenarios. As expected, the attacker’s load has a high inverse
correlation with the unit price (≈ −0.96).
more room for maneuver the attacker has to profit from their
attack.
B. Attack Outcomes
1) Outcome for the Attacker
Fig. 4 illustrates the resulting load curves of attacker and
victim in the case of a shift attack (σ = 4). The attacker
benefits by having a high load during the periods when the
victims have a low one and vice versa, so that the attacker’s
higher consumption takes place when the aggregated load, and
thus unit price, is low. This is exactly what the attacker tried
to achieve by manipulating the forecasting data and thus the
input to the scheduling game. More details about the cost
function model can be found in Section II-A and [11], [38].
In this attack example, there is a high inverse correlation,
i.e. ≈ −0.96, between the attacker’s load and the unit price.
An attacker’s financial benefit depends not only on the type
of attack, but also the number of households using a battery,
i.e. the participation rate N/M , as well as the proportion of
targeted households ρ whose forecasts have been changed. In
order to investigate this, attack simulations were conducted on
a smart grid comprising M = 25 households for a duration of
one year. Compared to the non-attack scenario, Fig. 5 displays
the percentage change on the attacker’s bill (yearly median of
the daily changes) according to those parameters in the cases
of shift (σ = 4), mirror (τ = −1) and scale (τ = 2) attacks.
Simulations have revealed that a flat attack (τ = 0) results in
benefits similar to those of the shift attack (σ = 4) and is thus
not shown.
Fig. 5 reveals that for shift (σ = 4) and mirror (τ = −1)
attacks the attacker is never penalised by their action and their
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Fig. 5. Financial benefit for the attacker. The median change (compared to the non–attack scenario) over 365 days of the energy bill for the attacker is shown
in per cent. The outcomes for three different attacks, i.e. shift attack with σ = 4, mirror attack, and scale attack with τ = 2, are presented. The simulations
were performed for M = 25 using various participation rates and percentages of targeted players. While the first two attacks display similar benefits, the
third one indicates that for specific scenarios the attacker also has an increased electricity bill.
gains increase with both participation rate and percentage of
targeted players. Bill reductions for the attacker reach up to
25.5% and 35.7%, respectively. However, in the case of the
scale attack (τ = 2), the graph displays a different picture:
Up to a relatively high participation rate (N/M > 55%), the
attacker is financially penalised by their attack. Indeed, while
the other attacks lead players to charge their battery at a
wrong time, this scale attack tends to make players charge their
battery more than they need at a time when the attacker would
also need to charge their battery. As Fig. 9 (cf. Appendix B)
reveals, when the participation rate is high, the aggregated load
profile is inverted due to a large number of players charging
their battery excessively at a time that was initially of low load
and discharging their battery when a peak was expected. As a
consequence, the aggregated load profile is now almost ideal
for the attacker who can benefit from low prices at their time
of high needs. Thus, they hardly need to use their battery and
can gain up to 9.5% of bill reduction.
2) Outcome for the Utility Company and the Other Players
As mentioned in Section II, for the utility company, the
efficiency of a microgrid is assessed by its PAR value. Since
attacks change the aggregated load, it is directly affected. The
effect of the previously introduced attacks on PAR values is
presented in Fig. 6. The different attack types are associated
to a different graph, which presents several curves, each for
a different percentage ρ of targeted players, showing the
relationship between participation rates N/M and PAR values.
For the shift (σ = 4) and mirror (τ = −1) attacks, an increase
of ρ leads to a worsening of PAR values. Moreover, as in
the non–attack scenario, PAR values tend to improve with an
increase of participation rate. Note for the case of the mirror
attack: If a high percentage of players are targeted, an increase
of the participation rate contributes to the degradation of PAR
values.
As analysed in the previous section, the outcomes of the
scale attack (τ = 2) are different from the others when the
participation rate is below N/M = 55%. In fact, Fig. 6 shows
an improvement of the PAR values compared to the non–
attack scenario when the percentage ρ of targeted players
increases. Fig. 9 clearly shows that at low participation rates
the aggregated load is flatter than without an attack. The ex-
planation is that this positive scaling incentivises participating
households to work harder to flatten the load curve: As seen
in Fig. 9, charging takes place at the same time but with a
higher intensity. As a consequence, a 52% participation rate
is sufficient to achieve a PAR that is similar to the one resulting
from a 100% participation rate without any attack, i.e. PAR
= 1.11 and PAR = 1.07, respectively. Participants work twice
harder, which has the same effect as if everybody was working
as they should. This extra work leads to higher bills for those
households. An improved PAR value may suggest that the
UC benefits from such attacks. In practice, this is not the
case because in those scenarios the electricity bills of all
players, including the attacker, increase substantially (data not
shown), which will eventually lead to a loss of reputation and
customers for the UC.
All attacks leading to the reduction of a single player’s (the
attacker) bill result in an increase of all the other players’
bills by usually a comparable amount, see Table I and II. As a
consequence, the aggregated bill for the whole neighbourhood
is significantly increased. For example, a mirror (τ = −1)
attack targeting all players (ρ = 100%) rewards the attacker
with a 35.7% bill cut, while the other players must endure a
54.0% rise on average. Similarly, the attacker benefits from a
scale attack (τ = −2, ρ = 28%) with a bill reduction of 1%,
penalising the other households by a 2.3% increase.
C. Attack Detection Strategies
All investigated attacks affect the utility company nega-
tively: When the participation rate is high, PAR values are
systematically degraded compared to the non–attack scenario;
otherwise, either PAR values worsen, or their improvement is
at the cost of higher electricity bills for the average household.
This is detrimental to the UC’s credibility and competitiveness.
Consequently, the UC needs to design defence strategies to
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Fig. 6. Peak-to-average ratio (PAR) of the aggregated load for different attack scenarios. The median PAR value for a 365 day simulation is plotted together
with the range between the first and third quartile over the participation rate. The outcomes for three different attacks, i.e. shift attack with σ = 4, mirror
attack, and scale attack with τ = 2, are presented. For each attack, the individual graphs differ in their number of attacked players. This also includes the
reference outcome of the scheduling game in which no player is attacked.
prevent attacks that affect the storage scheduling process. In
this study, the focus is on the detection of false data injection
by monitoring the forecasting data that are transmitted every
day on the smart grid communication system.
1) Attack Detection Through System Monitoring
Forecast monitoring is considered at three different levels:
• Aggregated consumption forecast average, i.e. average
amount monitoring
• Aggregated consumption forecast profile, i.e. deep aggre-
gated monitoring
• Household consumption forecast profiles, i.e. deep indi-
vidual monitoring
In each case, the UC would compare the received forecast
data with its own estimate. While monitoring the aggregated
consumption forecast total only requires the UC to forecast the
daily total electricity consumption of the smart grid commu-
nity as a whole, deep monitoring relies on producing hourly
consumption estimates for either the entire community or each
individual household. The more precise the monitoring, the
more resources are needed to implement it.
Since an individual average hourly forecast error for a
24-hour period is expected to be lower than 8% [33], the
expectation is that the difference between two forecasts, i.e.
the forecast provided by the received forecast data and the
forecast estimated by the UC, to be lower than twice the 8%
error of a single forecast. As a consequence, it is reasonable
to assume that the UC could use a threshold of 20% to
identify an attack when using deep individual monitoring. In
the case of deep aggregated monitoring, the combination of
forecasts tends to lead to error reduction. As consequence,
here a discrepancy of at least 10% is used to detect an
attack. Finally, since in the proposed attack scenarios, the
attacker always makes sure that their attack does not change
the average daily aggregated forecast, a UC relying only on
average amount monitoring would not be able to detect any
attack. Eventually, the detection of a given attack depends
not only on the chosen monitoring strategy, but also the type
of attack, the participation rate N/M and the percentage ρ of
targeted players.
2) Attack Impact Analysis
Based on the three proposed monitoring strategies, the
consequences of undetected attacks are studied. These are
evaluated by estimating an attack’s impact in terms of average
bill change for the attacker and the other players, bill revenue
change for the UC and PAR values. Assuming a participation
rate of N/M = 100%, this set of experiments considers, for
each attack type of interest, i.e. shift (σ = 4), flat (τ = 0),
mirror (τ = −1) and scale (τ = 2 and τ = 1.29), the
most severe attack, in terms of the highest percentage ρ of
targeted players, that has remained undetected according to
the monitoring strategy.
As Tables I and II show, all of those attacks prove beneficial
to the attacker in terms of reducing their bill, while other
players suffer a bill increase. Regarding the UC, it benefits
financially from the general bill rise, but sees its PAR value
degraded. Note that the impact of a scale (τ = 1.29) attack is
evaluated because it is the most powerful scale attack which
can target all players (ρ = 100%) without being detected by
any of the proposed monitoring strategies.
Table I reports the impact of undetected attacks despite
average amount monitoring. As such monitoring is ineffective
against the considered attacks, the attacker is able to carry out
their attack with maximum strength, i.e. (ρ = 100%), without
being detected. The mirror (τ = −1) attack is particularly
efficient: The attacker’s bill is reduced by 35.7% at the cost
of the other players’ bills, i.e. 54.0%, and a large increase of
the PAR value to 2.06 from a non–attack value of 1.12.
Once deep aggregated monitoring is in place, the strength
of the attacks that remain undetectable is reduced significantly.
As Table II shows, the attacker’s bill is lowered by 1.9% at
most. However, although, in this case, the other players are
hardly affected - their bills only increase by 0.3%, the UC
suffers from a significant degradation of the PAR to 1.23.
One should note that although the scale (τ = 2) attack with
SECURITY ATTACKS ON SMART GRID SCHEDULING AND THEIR DEFENCES 7
TABLE I
IMPACT OF UNDETECTED ATTACKS DESPITE AVERAGE AMOUNT MONITORING. RESULTS SHOW MEDIAN VALUES OVER 365-DAY SIMULATIONS
TOGETHER WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE INTERQUARTILE RANGE. THE PARTICIPATION RATE IS N/M = 100%.
Attack type ρ (%) Attacker Other players Utility companyBill change (%) Bill change (%) Revenues change (%) PAR value
Shift (σ = 4) 100 −25.5 (5.8) 28.3 (13.1) 26.3 (12.3) 1.67 (0.06)
Flat (τ = 0) 100 −21.0 (6.6) 16.7 (4.3) 15.1 (4.0) 1.66 (0.09)
Mirror (τ = −1) 100 −35.7 (12.5) 54.0 (11.1) 50.3 (10.5) 2.06 (0.14)
Scale (τ = 2) 100 −9.5 (2.8) 21.4 (4.4) 20.1 (4.2) 1.37 (0.03)
Scale (τ = 1.29) 100 −1.5 (0.8) 3.1 (0.8) 2.9 (0.7) 1.13 (0.03)
TABLE II
IMPACT OF UNDETECTED ATTACKS DESPITE DEEP AGGREGATED MONITORING. RESULTS SHOW MEDIAN VALUES OVER 365-DAY SIMULATIONS
TOGETHER WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE INTERQUARTILE RANGE. THE PARTICIPATION RATE IS N/M = 100%.
Attack type ρ (%) Attacker Other players Utility companyBill change (%) Bill change (%) Revenues change (%) PAR value
Shift (σ = 4) 16 −0.8 (0.7) 1.1 (0.5) 1.0 (0.5) 1.22 (0.11)
Flat (τ = 0) 28 −1.9 (1.1) 0.3 (0.5) 0.2 (0.5) 1.23 (0.05)
Mirror (τ = −1) 16 −1.7 (1.1) 0.9 (0.7) 0.8 (0.7) 1.25 (0.06)
Scale (τ = 2) 28 −1.0 (0.7) 2.3 (0.7) 2.2 (0.7) 1.11 (0.04)
*Scale (τ = 1.29) 100 −1.5 (0.8) 3.1 (0.8) 2.9 (0.7) 1.13 (0.03)
* denotes attack that remains undetected even when applying deep individual monitoring
(ρ = 28%) produces a slightly better PAR value, i.e. 1.11
instead of 1.12 from the non–attack scenario, this is achieved
by increasing the average electricity costs by 2.2%.
Finally, although the most stringent monitoring strategy,
i.e. deep individual monitoring, would detect most attacks
whatever ρ, i.e. shift (σ = 4), flat (τ = 0), mirror (τ = −1)
and scale (τ = 2), some limited scale attacks such as
(τ = 1.29, ρ = 100%) still cannot be discovered (cf. last
line of Table II). Although none of the proposed monitoring
strategies can detect all attacks, they are able to recognise
the most severe ones. Moreover, they can detect false data
injection for a wide range of attacks.
D. Attack Mitigation
Once an attack has been detected, some response needs to
be provided. For the most serious attacks, households may be
instructed not to follow the calculated battery schedule, but use
an alternative one. Several options are possible such as keeping
the same schedule as the previous day or recalculating their
schedule only taking into account their own data. In the latter
case, scheduling is executed without using the game–theoretic
framework, but by performing a simple optimisation of battery
usage for their own consumption forecast.
Those options were evaluated in a previous study [37]. It
showed that, although both approaches lead to a PAR reduc-
tion, local scheduling should be the defence of choice since it
systematically outperforms previous day scheduling. Still, this
mitigating strategy has its own cost: At medium participation
rates N/M , the PAR reduction can be up to ≈ 25% lower
than when the game is played. As Tables I and II show,
only the most powerful attacks have an impact on the PAR
which is higher than reverting to the local scheduling strategy.
This suggests that the best reaction to a low impact attack
would be to let it happen. In terms of monitoring, only deep
aggregated monitoring would prove useful, since it is able to
detect all attacks for which the proposed mitigation strategy
is beneficial. Therefore, a two-level detection system may be
the most suitable strategy for the UC: It should conduct either
no monitoring at all, or deep aggregated monitoring.
Before deciding on a complete defence strategy, which
includes detection and mitigation, all costs and benefits must
be taken into account by the UC, i.e. cost of monitoring,
cost of mitigating action, cost of reputation loss and benefit
of increased consumption. The main challenge for the utility
company is to control the spending on their security mea-
sures, as organisations typically have a restricted budget. For
example, if the expected probability of an attack is low, a
low investment in security could be justified. On the other
hand, if an attacker is aware of such a strategy, they would
be more likely to attack as they would expect less resistance.
Finding a solution to this decision–making problem cannot be
achieved by optimisation alone, but instead non-cooperative
game theory helps in devising suitable models and advising
on the expected likelihood of attacks.
IV. GAME–THEORETIC DEFENCE STRATEGY
When planning to defend against the false data injection
attacks described in the previous section, the need for the
utility company to allocate resources for the defence in the
most efficient way has been highlighted. This section proposes
to use game theory in order to support this decision–making
process. The game is motivated and introduced based on
detailing the payoff functions of the two players describing
the game normal form. This is followed by solving the game
using various assumptions. Finally, the solution is discussed
with respect to their implications for the simulated scenario
and potential alternatives.
A. Game Theory for Security
Game theory is increasingly being employed for modelling
attacker-defender scenarios in cyber security, for a broad
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TABLE III
IDS GAME OF [39] IN NORMAL FORM
D ↓ A → sAatt sA−att
sDmon αc, −βc −αf , 0
sD−mon −αm, βs 0, 0
range of scenarios such as intrusion detection in network
security [39], managing the security of information in an
organisation [40] and predicting the likelihood of cyber at-
tacks [41].
Non-cooperative game theory is based on the assumption
that players are rational, i.e. they choose between actions
such that they maximise their payoffs. The associated optimal
strategies can be identified using the fundamental concept
of the Nash Equilibrium (cf. Section II-B). Although not all
games have Nash Equilibrium, Nash’s theorem states that
nonzero-sum games always admit a mixed strategy equilib-
rium. However, for practical applications it may not be easy
to interpret [42].
In this paper, x and y denote a pure or mixed strategy of
the first and second player in a two-player game, and x∗ and
y∗ are used for optimal strategies of these players. A strategy
profile s = (x, y) groups strategies of each player together.
If the grouped strategies are optimal, the optimal strategy
profile is written as s∗. A two-player nonzero-sum game can
be represented in normal form, based on the players’ payoff
matrices A and B [43].
An optimal Nash Equilibrium strategy profile is a strategy
profile s∗ = (x∗, y∗) satisfying
x∗Ay∗ ≥ xAy∗ ∀x, x∗By∗ ≥ x∗By ∀y . (3)
Here, the strategies may be pure or mixed, and the correspond-
ing NE is referred to as pure or mixed. Furthermore, if all of
the inequalities in the above definition are strict, one has a
strict NE. Otherwise, the NE is non-strict.
B. Proposed Security Game
The proposed security game is a two-player nonzero-sum
complete information game [43] between the utility company
U and the attackerA. The game is inspired by the nonzero-sum
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) game of [39] which has been
thoroughly analysed in the literature and is well understood.
Table III illustrates the game where the two strategies available
to the defender are to monitor or not, denoted by the strategy
space SD = {sDmon, sD−mon}, and the attacker chooses between
attacking or not attacking: SA = {sAatt, sA−att}. The positive
parameters αc, αf , αm, βc and βs are used to denote the
payoffs corresponding to the various strategies. The main
characteristic of this game is the design of the payoff functions
in such a way that the monitoring defender only has an
incentive to defend in the presence of an attack. The attacker
is discouraged from attacking if there is defence in place.
This design leads to a circular path when considering payoff-
incrementing unilateral changes of strategy, hence prohibiting
the existence of a pure Nash Equilibrium.
1) Description of the Game
Here, an augmented security game is introduced, extending
the IDS game described previously by an additional action.
The rationale behind this extended game model is twofold:
Section III-C1 demonstrated the existence of low-impact at-
tacks which cannot be detected by standard monitoring tech-
niques, and it would be desirable to capture these in a more
sophisticated game model. Second, an extended game might
better match real-world scenarios and might lead to simpler
solutions, in this case pure equilibria rather than mixed ones.
a) Game Strategies: Section III presented three possible
monitoring strategies for U : to monitor the daily average of
forecasting data, to inspect the daily profile of the aggregated
forecast, and to inspect the individual forecast data with the
same level of detail. In this work, the assumption is made
that the first and second monitoring strategies are most useful
in a realistic setting, as they have an observable impact on
the strength and outcome of successful attacks while the third
monitoring strategy merely eliminates attacks that are possible
for weaker monitoring levels. Furthermore, as the data of
aggregated forecasts is readily available to the UC, the first
monitoring strategy is not very costly and is identified with the
strategy sU−mon. The second monitoring strategy is denoted as
sUmon so that the strategy space for the defender U is as in the
previous game SU = {sUmon, sU−mon}. The attackerA has three
different strategies: to attack strongly with high impact, to
perform a weaker attack with low impact, or not to attack at all.
This is denoted by the strategy space SA = {sAatt°, sAatt, sA−att}.
The additional weak attack strategy sAatt° offers an alterna-
tive incentive of not monitoring to the UC, preferring to save
monitoring cost when facing a weak attack. No assumption is
made on the relationship between the attacker’s overall payoff
when choosing the two different attack types, and a discussion
of conditions clarifying this relationship is the main subject of
the game analysis in the next section.
b) Game Payoff Functions: The following notations for
the payoffs for U are introduced: cUmon is the cost for mon-
itoring the daily profile of the aggregated forecast (second
monitoring strategy) and cUdef is an additional cost for investing
in defence mechanisms such as actions discussed in Section
III-D. Losses from weak and strong attacks are denoted by
lUatt° and l
U
att respectively. The payoff functions corresponding
to A are the benefits and costs associated with weak and strong
attacks, denoted by bAatt°, c
A
att°, and b
A
att and c
A
att, respectively.
The monitoring activity always leads to monitoring costs for
U . If there is no monitoring, U incurs losses lUatt° and lUatt due
to weak and strong attacks. Otherwise, despite monitoring,
weak attacks cannot be detected, hence there is a resulting
loss lUatt°. Strong attacks however are detected and mitigated
against through some countermeasures, preventing any losses
but leading to a defence cost cUdef . Finally, if there is no attack,
then the only arising nonzero payoff function involved is the
monitoring cost for U . The attacker A obtains a benefit bAatt°
from a weak attack, but has to invest in attack costs cAatt°.
Similarly, the cost cAatt arises from a strong attack, however
the model assumes the lack of a benefit for A due to the
SECURITY ATTACKS ON SMART GRID SCHEDULING AND THEIR DEFENCES 9
TABLE IV
SECURITY GAME IN NORMAL FORM
U ↓ A → sAatt° sAatt sA−att
sUmon −cUmon − lUatt°, lUatt° − cAatt° −cUmon − cUdef , −cAatt −cUmon, 0
sU−mon −lUatt°, lUatt° − cAatt° −lUatt, lUatt − cAatt 0, 0
UC’s defence mechanism. Using these notations, the proposed
security game G can be represented in normal form as shown
in Table IV.
2) Game Assumptions
In this section, assumptions on the relationship of the
various cost and benefit functions, which are part of the game
payoff matrices, are listed and justified.
a) Assumptions from the IDS Game: The cost for missing
an attack αm = lUatt > 0 is interpreted as losses from
an attack that is not mitigated against, the false alarm cost
αf = c
U
mon > 0 as an ongoing monitoring cost and the
detection penalty βc = cAatt > 0 as the cost for the at-
tacker to conduct a strong attack. The gain from detection
αc = −cUmon − cUdef > 0 is reformulated as necessary cost to
monitor and to defend in order to prevent damage. In order
to preserve the mixed equilibrium property of the security
game given by −αm < αc it is then assumed that this attack
prevention cost is less than the actual incurring attack damage,
i.e. cUmon+c
U
def < l
U
att. This assumption is natural: In a typical
security game, the defender does not spend more on attack
prevention than what they potentially loose from an attack.
Finally, βs = lUatt − cAatt > 0 is the difference between the
benefit from an undetected attack and the attack effort. This
expresses a similar principle as above, but this time applied
to the attacker A who does not spend more on an attack than
the expected gain from it. These assumptions can be referred
to as the Security Game Assumptions.
b) Augmented Security Game: The assumptions required
for the augmented security game are in parts inspired by those
of the IDS game, and also motivated by the experimental
results presented in Section III which suggest that strong
attacks require targeting more victims, i.e. a bigger effort.
For a weak attack, the attacker receives a greater payoff
than the cost of the attack, implying
cAatt° < l
U
att° . (4)
It can also be assumed that the cost for launching a strong
attack is higher than that for a weak attack since a higher
number of households has to be attacked
cAatt > c
A
att° . (5)
Finally, a strong attack leads to higher losses for the utility
(cf. Section III-B1)
lUatt > l
U
att° . (6)
Note that in order to aid the game analysis, an assumption
made in this game is that the benefit of the attacker is equal
to the loss of the defender, bAatt = l
U
att and b
A
att° = l
U
att° .
C. Game Analysis
In this section, analysis of the security game G reveals exis-
tence of several NE strategies. Following the study of practical
examples, the relevance of these strategies are discussed so that
they can be used to inform UC’s security investments.
1) Optimal Nash Equilibrium Strategies
To solve the augmented security game, three distinct cases
are considered. This is based on discussing the second order
difference
∆ = qatt° − qatt , (7)
where qatt° = lUatt° − cAatt° and qatt = lUatt − cAatt describe the
net-benefit for the attacker in case of a weak and strong attack,
respectively.
a) Case 1 (∆ > 0): In this case, the existence of
a unique pure NE for the game G can be asserted. The
corresponding NE strategy is for the UC to not monitor,
and for the attacker to carry out a weak attack. Due to the
uniqueness property these solutions are globally optimal.
Proposition 4.1: If lUatt° − cAatt° > lUatt − cAatt, the game
G admits a unique pure Nash Equilibrium strategy profile of
the form s∗ = (sU−mon, s
A
att°) and the corresponding payoffs
s∗U = −lUatt° and s∗A = lUatt° − cAatt° are globally optimal.
Proof: First, it needs to be verified that when choosing the
pure strategy profile (sU−mon, s
A
att°), none of the two players
benefits from a unilateral change of pure strategy.
Focusing on the UC, the change of strategy sU−mon → sUmon
diminishes its payoff since −lUatt° > −cUmon − lUatt° due to
the assumption of a positive monitoring cost. Considering the
attacker, the change sAatt° → sAatt is not beneficial because of
the main assumption ∆ > 0 of this case. Finally, the change
of strategy sAatt° → sA−att reduces the payoff due to Assump-
tion (4). Second, a careful inspection of the payoff functions
of the remaining strategies of the game, together with the fact
that the assumption of Case 1 implies lUatt° − cAatt° > −cAatt,
shows that there is no other pure NE.
b) Case 2 (∆ < 0): Similarly to the IDS game, the aug-
mented security game has the same property of circular paths
when performing unilateral changes strategy with increasing
payoffs, hence prohibiting the existence of any pure NE.
Proposition 4.2: If lUatt° − cAatt° < lUatt − cAatt, the game G
admits no pure NE.
Proof: The proof of this proposition is done very similarly
to that of Proposition 1 by comparing the changes in payoff,
following a unilateral change of strategy. It is clear that there
is no pure NE in the game restricted to the attacker strategies
sAatt and s
A
−att, as the resulting subgame is identical to the
IDS game. When augmented by the weak attack strategy sAatt° ,
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TABLE V
REPRESENTATIVE MIXED STRATEGY PROBABILITIES FOR CASE 2 ATTACKS BASED ON SIMULATIONS (CF. SECTION III-C2)
patt° = 36.3% patt = 63.7% p−att = 0%
pmon = 71.7% 26.0% 45.7% 0%
p−mon = 28.3% 10.3% 18.0% 0%
two cases may arise, depending on which of the strategy
changes sAatt → sAatt° or sAatt° → sAatt, starting from the initial
strategy profile (sUmon, s
A
att), lead to an increased payoff for
the attacker.
In the first case, one observes the additional sequence
of strategy changes sUmon → sU−mon, sAatt° → sAatt and
sU−mon → sUmon leading back to the original strategy profile.
These changes entail increased payoffs due to the assumption
of positive monitoring cost, the condition ∆ < 0 and the
Security Game Assumptions. In the second case, the unilateral
payoff change joins the circular path of the IDS game, from
which the proof follows as shown earlier.
c) Case 3 (∆ = 0): In this last case, one derives the
inequality lUatt° − cAatt° = lUatt − cAatt > −cAatt as in Case 1
and obtains a similar but weaker result, as the pure NE is not
strict. A formal proof of the following proposition is omitted
as it can be done similarly as that of Proposition 1 since the
same payoff deviations are involved.
Proposition 4.3: If lUatt° − cAatt° = lUatt − cAatt, the game
G admits a unique pure non-strict Nash Equilibrium strategy
profile of the form s∗ = (sU−mon, s
A
att°) and the corresponding
optimal payoffs are s∗U = −lUatt° and s∗A = lUatt° − cAatt°.
2) Quantitative Examples
Attacks discussed in Section III are further analysed using
the proposed augmented security game. In order to establish
which case they correspond to, estimations of the sign of
∆ (7) are performed using previous simulation calculations.
More specifically, bAatt and b
A
att° are represented by the values
of the A`ttacker bill change’ (γ and γ°), reported in Tables I
and II respectively, multiplied by the actual amount of the
bill λ, e.g. bAatt = l
U
att = γ · λ. Moreover, assuming a linear
relationship between the number of attacked players and the
cost of an attack, cAatt and c
A
att° can be expressed using the
values of percentage of targeted players (ρ and ρ°) shown in
Tables I and II respectively, e.g. cAatt = ρ·κ. As a consequence,
an attack type corresponds to Case 2, i.e. (∆ < 0), iff the
following inequality is satisfied:
γ° − γ
ρ° − ρ >
κ
λ
. (8)
with Assumption (4) stating γ°/ρ° > κ/λ .
Evaluations of attacks reported in Tables I and II show that
Case 2 applies to the shift (σ = 4), flat (τ = 0), mirror (τ =
−1) and scale (τ = 2) attacks. Hence, for none of those attacks
a pure NE exits and only mixed strategies can be offered.
Using the mirror attack as an example, Equation (8) requires
0.41 > κ/λ and Assumption (4) imposes 0.11 > κ/λ.
Since the scale (τ = 1.29) attack was especially designed to
be undetectable by the proposed monitoring solution, it cannot
be analysed by the game which assumes that a successful
monitoring strategy is available. On the other hand, the best
strategy for such attack is self-evident: Since all attack results
in gains for the attacker, they should attack, while the UC
should not waste any resources in ineffective defence.
In order to investigate the mixed strategies associated to
those attacks, numeral values were selected so that mixed
strategies could be computed using an NE solver [44]: λ =
100, κ = 10, cUmon = 10 and c
U
def = 20. Table V shows
representative mixed strategy probabilities associated with the
investigated Case 2 attacks, here the mirror attack. The attacker
either performs a strong (63.7% probability) or weak (36.3%
probability) attack, while the UC chooses to use monitoring
with a 71.7% probability. Note that the choice of numerical
values is not critical. As long as all the game assumptions are
fulfilled, the probability for the monitoring action of the UC
is at least 70%.
3) Discussion
Theoretical analysis of the proposed extended game model
has shown that according to the sign of ∆ (7), three different
cases should be considered. While, both Case 1 (∆ > 0)
and Case 3 (∆ = 0) are associated to a pure NE, only Case
1’s is strict. However, in both cases, the optimal NE strategy
for the UC is the same: not to monitor. On the other hand,
Case 2 (∆ < 0) only leads to mixed strategies. Practical
analysis, investigating the attack examples described in Section
III based on a 100% participation rate, revealed that only Case
2 was practically relevant. This is in line with expections that
the net benefits, i.e. benefits minus costs, of strong attacks are
supposed to be higher than those of weak attacks. Note that for
the scale (τ = 2) attack, different cases could arise at lower
participation rates due to its specific behaviour as shown in
Fig. 5 and Fig. 9.
Regarding Case 2, for a UC, the practical application of
optimal strategies, as illustrated in Table V, is not straightfor-
ward. Actually many suggestions have been made regarding
possible interpretations of mixed strategies [45]–[47]. In the
specific context of this work, that proposed by [47] is of
particular interest: Indeed, assuming that the UC supplies a
set of microgrids, where security strategy is decided at the
microgrid level, they, seen as a population, would choose
defence strategies following the mixed probabilities. Alterna-
tively, as suggested in [43], [48], the probability associated to
defence could be interpreted as an index of security criticality
which would inform the UC’s decisions regarding its defence
investments. Interestingly, experiments (not shown) indicates
that when the cost of attacking a singler player, i.e. κ, de-
creases, the mixed strategy probability for monitoring grows,
increasing defence needs.
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Finally, the undetectable scale (τ = 1.29) attack is a
reminder that no practical monitoring strategy is perfect and
the best defence strategy may be not to defend if the losses
associated to an attack can be considered as acceptable.
V. CONCLUSION
Protecting smart grids from cyber attacks is essential for
them to deliver their promises. Investigating different classes
of false data injection attacks against the forecasts required
for smart energy scheduling, extensive simulations showed the
extent of damages that a single attacker can cause to both the
utility company (growth of PAR value by up to 84%) and
its consumers (bill increase by up to 54%). The need for
mitigation having been established, monitoring and defence
strategies were proposed. In order to assess their value and
advise utility companies on their optimal attack prevention
strategy, a novel and generic security game that considers low
and high-impact attacks was designed. Its analysis highlighted,
in particular, conditions under which a Nash Equilibrium
exists. Interestingly, in those cases, the best strategy is for
the utility company not to invest in any monitoring and the
attacker to conduct low-impact attacks. Numerical evaluations
considering the previously studied classes of attacks revealed
that there is a type of attack where, indeed, no monitoring is
the best strategy. However, in all the other cases, only mixed
strategies can be offered. Their practical interpretation by UCs
was discussed. As a conclusion, the proposed security game
offers utility companies the ability to investigate the most
appropriate monitoring and defence strategies so that false
data injection attacks have only very limited, if any, impact
on smart energy scheduling.
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APPENDIX A
SIMULATING FORECASTING ERRORS
Since forecasting electricity consumption is out of the scope
of this study, forecasts were simulated instead of produced
by a forecasting algorithm. However, in order to consider
forecasts as realistic, they must show some deviation from the
actual consumption. As it has been reported that the average
error in individual forecasted data is around 8% [33], some
random error is added to the actual consumption values to pro-
duce sufficiently inaccurate forecasts. Although errors could
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Fig. 7. Individual forecast created by adding random errors. While the dashed
curve is the actual demand of an household, addition and subtraction of 10%
are represented by the two dotted curves. The bold curve is one example of
simulated forecast produced using the described method. Here, whereas the
average error is 7.5%, there are some values outside the 10% error area.
be added following a Gaussian law, the obtained forecasted
profile would prove unrealistic since it would display random
jumps. As a consequence, some smoothing effect is added by
linking successive values. More specifically, for each value
i, a random error is initially calculated ei, then the actual
error added to the value i is the average of the corresponding
ei and its neighbours, i.e. Ei =
ei−1+ei+ei+1
3 . As seen on
Fig. 7, with this approach, simulated forecast is smoother and,
as a consequence, more realistic. Due to the relatively large
number of players, despite the added errors, the aggregated
forecast remains quite similar to the aggregated demand (an
average error of around 2% was estimated experimentally).
As a consequence, game solutions based on forecast with and
without errors are close: drawing the histogram of the error
per day during a whole year (not shown) reveals an average
error of 8% [9].
APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Fig. 8 shows a flow diagram of the augmented security game
which helps to understand the analysis in Sec. IV.
Fig. 9 provides details to the discussion in Sec. III-B1 about
individual household schedules and the influence of the scale
attack with τ = 2.
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U ↓  A → A satt° A satt 
A s–att 
U smon 
U s−mon 
U U − cmon − latt° 
U A latt° − catt°  
U A latt  − catt  
A − catt  
U U − cmon − cdef 
U − latt° 
0 
U − latt 0 
0 
U − cmon 
U A latt° − catt°  
Case 1 (Δ > 0) Case 2 (Δ < 0) Case 3 (Δ = 0) 
Fig. 8. Advanced security game flow diagram. This figure is a more extensive representation of the game shown in Table IV, including the relations between
the respective quantities. The arrows indicate which strategy would be more preferable in terms of the individual players’ utility function. As discussed in
Section IV-C the connection between the IDS game (in green) and the proposed augmented security game is defined by the second order difference ∆ (7)
which is highlighted here by the red dotted lines. Depending on the sign of ∆ (7), the direction of the arrows varies as illustrated in the three cases. Note
that the double line represents equality.
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Fig. 9. Aggregated load and battery schedule without and under a scale (τ = 2) attack targetting all players for different household participation rates (ρ).
Each column corresponds to a different participation rate, i.e. from left to right ρ = 28%, ρ = 52% and ρ = 100%. The first row shows battery schedules of
each individual household; the second row shows battery schedules of each individual household under attack - note that the first household is the attacker; the
third row compares aggregated loads without - dashed curves - and with - bold curves - attacks. Without attack, participation of all households, i.e. ρ = 100%,
is required to flatten the aggregated load (PAR = 1.07). However, excessive battery usage by attacked households (the second row shows stronger charges
and discharges) leads to a relatively flat (PAR = 1.11) aggregated load at ρ = 52%. However, at ρ = 100% the aggregated load profile is almost inverted;
in this case the attacker hardly needs to use their battery.
